University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1988

Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law
Stephen B. Burbank
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Legal
Studies Commons

Repository Citation
Burbank, Stephen B., "Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law"
(1988). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1258.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1258

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal
Rules and Common Law

Stephen B. Burbank*
To the average lawyer it is Sanskrit; to the experienced federal practi
tioner it is monopoly; to the author of text books on federal practice it
is a golden harvest.1

This description of federal practice and procedure under the Con
formity Act of 18722 was an article of faith with those who labored for
years to persuade Congress to replace that s tatute with an act empower
ing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure for actions at
law. 3 The accuracy of the description was disputed by some members of
the bar, of the judiciary, and of Congress during the entire period of that.
long campaign .4 There would be little point in trying to determine who
had the better of the debate, for even those who are interested in the
history of American procedure and in the rhetoric of procedural reform
are likely to be more interested in areas within the contemporary land
scape of federal practice and procedure where yesterday's rhetoric is to
day's reality. I propose to examine one such area, federal limitations law,
where there is a distressing aptness for our situation in this rhetorical
gem of another age. I will also argue that federal limitations law is not
unique-that the description is more broadly applicable-and s uggest a
s trategy for reform . But the occasion would not permit careful broad
s cale exploration, and perhaps the maj or lesson that I derive from this
work is that the quest for broad-scale solutions is at times misdirected.
Since the beginning of the Republic, the federal courts have s trug
gled with the problem of limitations periods for federal statutes that do
not specify the time within which a suit must be brought.5 Unable to fill
the gaps with judge-made rules, 6 but unwilling to indulge the notion that
©

1 988 Stephen B. Burbank
*
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I appreciate the comments of those at the Sym
posium and of participants at the Legal Studies Seminar, University of Pennsylvania Law School, on
various incarnations of this paper. As usual, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Frank Goodman,
Seth Kreimer, Linda Silberman and Steve Subrin for wise suggestions and warm support.
1 Report of the Committee on Uniform judicial Procedure , 46 A.B.A. REP. 46 1 , 466 ( 1 92 1 ) .
2 Act ofjune l, 1 872, ch. 255, § 5, 1 7 Stat. 1 96, 1 9 7 .
3 See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 1 30 U. PA. L. REv. 1 0 1 5, 1 039-42 ( 1 98 2 ) .
4 See id. at 1 04 1 nn. l 07- 1 08, 1 063-64, 1 083-84 n.296.
5 See McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 ( 1 830) . See generally Special Project, Time Bars in
Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CoRNELL L.
REv. l O l l ( 1 980).
6 See Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General
Approach , 7 1 CoRNELL L. REV. 733, 769-70 ( 1 986); Currie, On Blazing Trails: judge Friendly and Federal
jurisdiction, 1 33 U. PA. L. REv. 5, 6, 8 ( 1 984); Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95
HARV . L. REv. 1 7 1 7 , 1 72 1 ( 1 982). "The length of a limitations period is arbitrary-you can't reason
your way to it-and courts are supposed not to be arbitrary; when they are, they get criticized for it."
Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 1 987).
693

694

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 63:693

a federal statutory claim is timeless, 7 the federal courts found in the
Rules of Decision Act' s reference to the "laws of the several states" the
path ofleast resistance . 8 But it was hardly a clear path, as cases involving
claims within the exclusive j urisdiction of the federal courts demon
strated. Whatever the role envisioned for the Rules of Decision Act at
the time it was passed,9 how can a state statute of limitations plausibly be
thought to " apply" in a case that the courts of the s tate are powerless to
hear ? 1 0
Although Congress has i n some instances rescued the fed eral courts
from this embarrassment, as in the Clayton Act, 1 1 the proliferation of
federal statutory law and of implied rights of action in this century have
combined to keep litigants and courts busy guessing, in a pale imitation
of comparative law, what the most closely analogous state law i s . I doubt
that anybody would contend that such activity represents an optimal use
of resources . It may be useful, however, to identify its costs . 1 2
A regime of borrowed state limitations law imposes a variety o f costs
on litigants . Until such time as the most closely analogous state law has
been authoritatively identified, a cons cientious lawyer who has been con
sulted about the possibility of commencing l itigation must b ecome con
versant with multiple sources of substantive law 1 3 -in the process ,
identifying the pertinent choice o f law rule.1 4 Having determined the
most closely analogous body of state substantive law and its governing
limitations provision, our hypothetical lawyer must consider whether, ap
plied to the federal claim in question, that provision would be hostile to
or inconsistent with the policies animating the federal statute or with fed7 See, e.g. , Wilson v . Garcia, 47 1 U.S. 26 1 , 2 7 1 ( 1 985); Campbell v. Haverhill, !55 U . S . 6 1 0, 6 1 61 7 ( 1 895) ; Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 34 1 ( 1 805) . But see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 ( 1 97 7) (refusing to borrow state statute of limitations for EEOC enforcement
action).
8 The Rules of Decision Act provides: "The laws of the several states, except where the Consti
tution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1 652 ( 1 982).
For a revisionist reading of the Court's cases by a justice who regards the Rules of Decision Act
as redundant and who is willing to indulge the notion that a federal statutory claim is timeless, see
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 1 07 S. Ct. 2759, 2767-74 ( 1 987) ( S calia,]., concur
ring in judgment) . Revisionism is not, however, uncommon in this corner of the law. See DelCos
tello v. I nternational Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 1 5 1 ( 1 983); infra text accompanying note 8 1 .
9 See Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of
Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1 5 1 3 ( 1 984); Burbank, supra note 6, at 76 1 n.l2 1 .
1 0 See Campbell v. Haverhill, 1 55 U.S. 6 1 0, 6 1 4-20 ( 1 895) (state statute of limitations applied
under Rules of Decision Act in federal patent action); Burbank, supra note 6, at 8 24 n .440.
1 1 1 5 U.S.C. § 1 5b ( 1 982). See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp . , 383 U.S. 696, 704 ( 1 966).
1 2 Cf Burbank, supra note 6, at 767-68 (costs of borrowed state preclusion law applied to federal
question judgment of federal court). Compare id. at 8 1 1 - 1 2 (state court judgments) .
1 3 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 1 07 S. Ct. 2759, 2763-64 ( 1 98 7 ) . Compare
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 1 07 S. Ct. 2 6 1 7 , 262 1 ( 1 987) ( § 1 98 1 actions sound in tort) with id. at
2625-3 1 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (§ 1 98 1 actions sound in contract) .
1 4 See Burbank, supra note 6 , at 768 ( " [T]he constraints o n choice of law applicable t o the exer
cise of diversity jurisdiction do not obtain outside of that context"). See also University of Tenn. v.
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796-99 ( 1 986) (using a federal choice of law rule that, when uniform federal
requirements are met, refers to the law of the renderin g state to determine the preclusive effects of
the unreviewed proceedings of a state administrative agency on a subsequent § 1 98 3 action in fed
eral court).
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eral rights .15 This is likely to be a difficult, time-consuming, and expen
sive process, and no less so for a conscientious defense lawyer.
Moreover, neither the lawyers' unilateral research nor, if they disagree,
their subsequent litigation on the question has anything to do with the
merits of federal claims that might be or have been made in litigation.
There may be some questions of federal law, uncertainty about which, at
least for a time, benefits the federal system, 16 but limitations is not one of
them . 1 7
The difficulty of ascertaining the governing period in a system of
borrowed state limitations law sugges ts that other, more significant, costs
may be entailed . Even a conscientious plaintiff ' s lawyer may prove to be
wrong about the answer to the problem, and the costs of error may in
clude the loss of the client's federal substantive rights . 1 8 If the client is
risk averse, the most likely strategy in response will be (if possible) to
bring suit within the shortest of all putatively applicable limitations peri
ods . Such a strategy imposes costs of its own, driving into court griev
ances that, in the ripeness of time, might never become disputes , 19
increasing the incidence of frivolous claims, 20 and creating the possibility
of duplicative litigation.2 1 From the perspective of putative defendants ,
uncertainty as to the governing limitations period is at war with the goal
of repose that is thought to animate that body of law.22
A regime of borrowed state limitations law also imposes costs on
courts, both federal, and in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, state. The
problem of finding the "right" period may be no less difficult for
judges,23 and, depending on the quality of advocacy, it may be no less
time-consuming. Again, that time is spent on a question unrelated to the
merits of the litigation, one for which simplicity and predictability are
traditionally thought a necessary, if not an adequate, answer to a charge
of arbitrariness . 24 But in this instance, the charge cannot be laid at the
1 5 See, e.g. , Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 ( 1 977) ("[I]t is the duty of the
federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the
implementation of national policies ").
16 See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 1 54 , 1 60 ( 1 984); S . EsTREICHER & J . SEXTON, REDEFIN
ING THE SuPREME CouRT's RoLE 48-52, 73-74 ( 1 986) .
1 7 See Wilson v. Garcia, 4 7 1 U.S. 26 1 , 272 ( 1 985) ( "uncertainty and time-consuming litigation");
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 ( 1 983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Few areas of the law
stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied rules than does the subject of periods of
limitations"). See also Norris v. Wirtz, 8 1 8 F.2d 1 329, 1 332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 08 S. Ct. 329
( 1 987) .
1 8 See Wilson v. Garcia, 4 7 1 U.S. 26 1 , 275 n.34 ( 1 985) . By reason of the operation of preclusion
rules, the rights lost may include rights, both federal and state, that were not asserted in the com
plaint. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF jUDGMENTS § 25 comment e ( 1 982).
1 9 See Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claim
ing . .. , 1 5 LAw & Soc'v R Ev . 63 1 ( 1 980-8 1 ) .
20 See FED. R. Crv. P. 1 1 advisory committee note ( " [W]hat constitutes a reasonable inquiry may
depend on such factors as how much time for investigation was available to the signer . . . . ) .
2 1 M y hypothetical risk averse plaintiff may b e forced to split her claim because part o f i t i s not
yet ripe. Imagine, for instance, a person who is not yet entitled to sue under Title VII. See 4 2 U.S .C.
§ 2000e-5(f) ( 1 982) .
22 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 2 6 1 , 275 n.34 ( 1 985) .
2 3 See supra note 1 3.
24 In McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 ( 1 830) , the Court stated:
Of late years, the courts, in England and in this country, have considered statutes of limita
tions more favorably than formerly. They rest upon sound policy and tend to the peace and
"
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doorstep of the legislature.25 Moreover, becaus e the process of finding
the most closely analogous state law has the trappings of rationality,
w hen itself revealed as arbitrary, it may detract from the appe arance of
j us tice under law that is important to continued respect for the institu
tion of courts . 2 6
Finally, some of the costs identified above and others to b e men
tioned here should be viewed from the discrete perspective of the federal
policies or interests sought to be advanced in the underlying sub stantive
law. The inadvertent loss of a federal claim by a plaintiff whose lawyer,
without fault, guessed wrong about the governing limitations period is
one such cost. The existence of disuniform limitations p eriods for the
same federal claim, depending on the state in which suit is brought, and
difficult to explain or justify to a lay person, 2 7 is another. The problems
of supervising a system of borrowed state limitations law, p articularly
acute in cases within concurrent jurisdiction, present a third . 28 The
S upreme Court may feel pressure to allot a disproportionate amount of
its precious docket to borrowed limitations cases, either to minimize in
terstate disuniformity or to check the application of state statutes that are
hostile to or inconsistent with federal rights .
I believe that, in recent years , the Court has felt pressure on its
docket from federal limitations cases. In any event, the C ourt has
evinced awareness of many of the costs imposed by a system of borrowed
state limitations law. The Court appears to be following a number of
different, but related, strategies to minimize these costs .
First, the Court has made it clear that the search for analogies can
include other fed eral substantive schemes as well as state substantive law,
and that if the most closely analogous scheme with a limitations period is
fed eral, that limitations period should be borrowed. 29 Even when the
welfare of society. The courts do not now, unless compelled by the force of former deci
sions, give a strained construction, to evade the effect of those statutes. By requiring those
who complain of injuries to seek redress by action at law, within a reasonable time, a salu
tary vigilance is imposed, and an end is put to litigation.
!d. at 278-79. Cf Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 64 1 , 648-49 ( 1 960) ("So long as the time set be not
unreasonable, it is less important what the limit be than that there be a rule whereby some timetable
may be known to the profession.").
2 5 Except in the case of rights of action implied by the courts, however, Congress can and should
be criticized for failing to provide a limitations period in the statute.
26 Cf Burbank, supra note 6, at 826 ("Even if the administrability of a system of borrowed state
law were the only relevant consideration, one might well conclude that federal j udges should not be
distracted by the judicial equivalent of a wild goose chase."). But see Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d
688, 690 (7th Cir. 1 987) ("Of course, in deciding which statute of limitations to borrow, the court is
choosing among arbitrary periods set by a legislature; but the choice itself is not arbitrary.") .
Whether or not the process is arbitrary, it can entail the cost posited in the text if it engenders
uncertainty that leads to the inadvertent loss of federal substantive rights. See supra note 1 8 , infra
text accompanying notes 34-35.
2 7 " Where legal rules are essentially arbitrary and cannot even be defended on grounds of sov
ereign or institutional integrity, one who suffers their consequences is quick to sense inequitable
administration of the law." Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under theJudicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 1 3 1 U. PA. L. REv. 283, 327 ( 1 982). Compare the application of
disuniform state law for a federal claim when state interests are implicated. See, e.g., United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 7 1 5 ( 1 979) .
28 Cf Burbank, supra note 6, at 767-70 (administrability problems of borrowed state preclusion
law applied to federal question judgment of federal court) .
29 See De!Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 1 5 1 ( 1 98 3 ) .
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plausibility of the federal alternative is subject to question, as it was in
the Court's recent decision borrowing a limitations period found in the
Clayton Act for civil RICO actions,30 the benefi t s of a uniform limitations
per�od may appear sufficient, particularly considering the irreducible ar
bitrariness of all limitations law, to carry the day.
Second, in civil rights cases subject to 42 U .S.C. Section 1 988, the
Court has also attempted to minimize the costs of the borrowing process .
By prescribing uniform federal characterizations o f actions under 42
U . S . C . Section 1 98331 and 42 U .S.C. Section 1981,32 the Court has re
duced both the transaction costs for litigants and courts and the costs
that errors by either entail for the federal system . 33 Of course, those
characterizations are crude, but they could hardly be cruder than the as
sumption that individually tailored solutions are always synonymous with
just solutions .34 When limitations are at issue, the plaintiff may not be
alive to wear the suit. ss
Third, the Court has addressed the problem of subsidiary rules that
are part of the baggage of limitations law, rules that, for instance, deter
mine when a limitations period begins to run , when it is suspended, and
when it ceases to run. For a time it seemed that the Court was willing to
rest with the perception that in the case of some such rules the trip is
nothing without the baggage, that, in other words, limitations periods
should not be viewed, and thus not b orrowed, in isolation.36 That per
ception has recently been confirmed by Paul Carrington, whose analysis
of modern limitations law makes the point that, in an age of discovery
and other equitable doctrines, one often cannot tell a statute of limita
tions by the statute. 37
30 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987); Comment, The
Parameters of Federal Common Law: The Case of Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 136 U . PA. L.
REv. 1447 (1988 ) . See also In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (borrow
ing provisions from 1934 Securities Act for implied right of action); Reed v. United Transp. Union,
828 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1987 ) , cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988) (borrowing provision in § 10(b) of
National Labor Relations Act for claims under § 101 of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo
sure Act) .
31 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) .
32 Goodman v. Lukens Steels Co., 107 S Ct. 2617 (1987).
33 That is hardly to say, however, that these cases have solved all of the problems. See, e.g.,
Owens v . Okure, 816 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987), art. granted, 108 S . Ct. 1218 (1988) (choosing between
different state statutes of limitations for intentional and unintentional personal injuries in section
1983 action).
34 Cf Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (" 'Simple justice' is achieved
when a complex body of law developed over a period of years is evenhandedly applied. The doc
trine of res judicata serves vital public interests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc determination
of the equities in a particular case" ) . See also infra text accompanying note 189.
35 See, e.g., Goodman v . Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 2621-22 (1987) (2-year statute ap
plied retroactively); Cannon v. Kroger Co. , 837 F.2d 660, 669-70 (4th Cir. 1988) (Murnaghan, J,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (contending that "majority's new filing rule . . . shouid
not be applied retroactively") . See also Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 1987) ("No
federal RICO litigant (plaintiff or defendant) could have had reasonable expectations about the ap
plicable statute of limitations when this case arose, because the question of the applicable statute was
(and is) intensely contested and highly uncertain.").
36 See, e.g., Johnson v. REA, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975 ) .
37 SeeP. Carrington, An Appreciation of Walter Wheeler Cook, Erie and the Rules Enabling Act
5-7 Qanuary 9, 1988) (unpublished remarks at Association of American Law Schools, Section on
Civil Procedure).
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Recently, however, the Court has become restless, and, with visi ons
of uniformity dancing in their heads , the Justices have determined to b e
even more aggressive in seeking federal fillers for the gaps in federal
limitations law. The issue before the Court in West v. Conrai/,38 or so it
may have seemed , was selecting a rule to determine when a borrowed
s tatute of limitations ceases to run on federal claims . The claims in ques
tion were brought by a railroad employee against his employer, union,
and union representative under the Railway Labor Act.39 The six-month
limitations period governing them was borrowed from federal, not state,
law-the National Labor Relations Act40-in an extension of the drive
toward uniformity that I have briefly described.4 1 Finding in the same
s tatute a rule that required service within the six-month period, the dis
trict court dismissed the action . The Court of Appeals affirmed.4 2
The Court announced in West that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure-"A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with
the court"43-provides the rule for stopping limitations periods that are
borrowed to fill gaps in federal law.44 Because the employee in West had
38
39
40

1 07 S. Ct. 1 538 ( 1 987) .
45 U.S.C. § § 1 5 1 -88 ( 1 982) .
Section 1 0(b) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the B oard for such
purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint
stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a
member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less
than five days after the serving of said complaint: Provided, That no complaint shall issue
based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of
the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom
such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such
charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall
be computed from the day of his discharge. Any such complaint may be amended by the
member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board in its discretion at any time
prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have
the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or
o therwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion
of the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any other person
may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any such
proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evi
dence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure
for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United
States pursuant to section 2072 of Title 28.
29 u.s.c. § 1 60(b) ( 1 982) .
4 1 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had previously held that section l O(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act governs a claim of unfair representation under the Railway Labor Act.
Sisco v. Conrail, 732 F.2d 1 1 88, 1 1 93 (3d Cir. 1 984) . The court relied on DelCostello v . Interna
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 1 5 1 ( 1 983), which involved a hybrid action under the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1 85 ( 1 982) . See supra text accompanying note 29. In West,
the parties agreed that the same limitations period governs hybrid breach of contract/breach of the
duty of fair representation claims under the Railway Labor Act, but neither the court of appeals nor
the Supreme Court passed on the question. See West v. Conrail, 780 F.2d 3 6 1 , 362 (3d Cir. 1 985);
West v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 1 07 S Ct. 1 538, 1 54 1 n.2 ( 1 987) .
42 West v. Conrail, 780 F.2d 36 1 (3d Cir. 1 985) .
43 FED. R. Ctv. P. 3.
44 Although we have not expressly so held before, we now hold that when the underlying
cause of action is based on federal law and the absence of an express federal statute of
limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute, the ac
tion is not barred if it has been "commenced" in compliance with Rule 3 within the bor
rowed period.
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filed his complaint within the six-month period, the C ourt reversed the
decision below.45 So intent was the Court on extending uniformity to
this subsidiary matter that it simply ignored the sources of its lawmaking
authority. If that were all-if in this case, as in others in the progression,
the obj ection were one of technique rather than result-the matter might
be, as Paul Carrington has suggested it is ,46 merely of academic interest.
But both the technique and the result in West are open to obj ection, and,
in any event, academics are not the only people who should be
interested.
Since the Supreme Court's 1 94 1 decision in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. ,47
neither courts nor commentators have evinced much interest in reconsid
ering the restrictions imposed on Federal Rules by the Rules Enabling
Act.4 8 In the case of the lower federal courts , this is not surprising. The
rules in question are promulgated by the Supreme Court, and lower fed
eral courts may assume, as the chairman of the original Advisory Com
mittee guessed the bar would assume, " that the Court will s tand by its
rules . "49 Indeed, in light of the failure of the Court to s trike down any
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure challenged in the intervening fifty years ,
experience confirms what psychology suggests . Even a judge or a court
that believes there is always a firs t time-or that there can be when the
restrictions in question were intended to restrain those called upon to
interpret them50-confronts ( 1 ) authoritative pronouncements that the
Act's restrictions implement, and imp lement only, federalism concerns;5 1
West v. Consolidated Rail Corp . , 1 07 S. Ct. 1 538, 1 54 1 ( 1 987). See id. at 1 542 n.6 ("The governing
principle is that we borrow only what is necessary to fill the gap left by Congress . " ) .
4 5 /d. at 1 540, 1 542.
46 SeeP. Carrington, supra note 37, at 2 1 -2 2 .
47 3 1 2 u.s . 1 ( 1 94 1 ) .
48 The Rules Enabling Act provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts
and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions, including admiralty and maritime
cases, and appeals therein, and the practice and procedure in proceedings for the review by
the courts of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court of the United States and for the judicial
review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and of
ficers.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve
the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief
Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first day
of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to the contrary notwithstanding,
shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by the
Supreme Court.
28 U .S.C. § 2072 ( 1 982). See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 02 1 -2 3; Whitten, Erie and the Federal
Rules: A Review and Reappraisal after Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, 2 1 CREIGHTON
L. R EV . I, 1 -2 , 42 ( 1 987) .
49 Letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon. Warren Olney, Jr. (January 1 5, 1 938) (Clark
Papers, Sterling Library of Yale University, box 1 1 1 , folder 54) . See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 34
n.530.
50 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 0 1 -02.
5 1 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 3 1 2 U.S. 1 , 9- 1 0 ( 1 94 1 ) ; Hanna v . Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465
( 1 965) ("The broad command of Erie was therefore identical to that of the Enabling Act: federal
courts are to apply state 'substantive' law and federal 'procedural' law. "); id. at 4 7 1 ("both the En-
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so-called "test" for validity that, unless one is very careful, answers

itself; 52 and

(3)

a presumption of validity that effectively passes the buck

to Congress.53
It is less easy either to explain or justify the failure of scholars to

confront the Court's approach to the Enabling Act. To a considerable
extent, I suspect, that failure was due for many years to vagaries in what I
have misleadingly called the Court's "approach," and to fascination with
Erie R. R. Co. v. Tom pkins, 54 a brooding omnipresence55 that was responsi
ble for those vagaries and that, while it was omnipresent, rendered the
Enabling Act a small point ar which to stick.56
More recently, a distinguished scholar bucked this trend.57 He did
so with such clarity, verve and style that those inclined to follow in his
path may have failed to note that, in an otherwise valuable article dispel
ling one myth, Professor

Ely

helped to entrench another. I speak of the

myth of federalism, which would have us believe that, four years before
Erie - when Swift v. Tyson 58 was in full flower- and in a statute author
izing rules of practice and procedure for all civil litigation in the federal
courts- litigation that even in the early 1930's involved predominantly
questions of federal substantive law59-Congress was only concerned, or
even primarily concerned, about the inappropriate displacement of state
law.60
As a historical matter, there can be no doubt that the major purpose
of those who wrote and defended the bill that became the Enabling Act
was to allocate power to make federal law prospectively between the
Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress, not to protect only lawmak
ing that has already occurred, and certainly not to protect only state law.
Such a purpose accommodates the reality that substantive rights are "en
larged" when they are created for the first time in court rules. Although
animated by concern for separation of powers, it also holds the potential
abling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that federal courts are to apply state 'substantive' law and
federal 'procedural' law") . See also Burbank, supra note 3, at 1028-30, 1034-35.
52 "The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforc
ing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for disregard or infraction of them." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. I, 14 (1941). See Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965) .
53 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 4 71 (1965); see also Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 107 S. Ct.
967, 970 (1987); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. I, 15-16 (1941) . For criticism of the Court's
reliance on the provision in the Enabling Act requiring proposed Federal Rules to lie before Con
gress, see Burbank, supra note 3, at 1102, 1178-79, 1196 & n.779. For demonstration that the origi
nal Advisory Committee relied on at least one principle of rulemaking (incorporation of existing
federal law) that calls into question an essential predicate of the Court's presumption of validity, see
id. at 1147-57.
54 304 U.S. 64 (1938 ) .
55 See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v . Tompkins, 5 5 YALE
L.J. 267 ( 1 946) .
56 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1027-33, 1110-11 n.435.
57 See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. R EV . 693 (1974).
5 8 41 U.S. (16 Pet. ) I (1842).
59 A study of civil cases in thirteen districts for the year ending June 30, 1930 revealed that
jurisdiction in 77.7% of the cases was based only on the presence of the United States as a party or
o n the assertion of a federal question. AMERICAN L"'-W lNST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS O F THE fED
ERAL CouRTS, PART II, CIVIL CASES 47 (1931) . Diversity cases accounted for only 18.4% of the total.
Id.

60

See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1033-35, II 06-12, 1122-25.
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to serve federalism values , protecting both existing and potential state
law by remitting to Congress the decision whether there shall be pro
spective federal law on " substantive" matters and the content of that
law.6 1
For one who does not admit the relevance of th e Enabling Act's leg
islative his tory to its interpretation, both the Court's62 and Professor
Ely's63 approaches to the Enabling Act should nevertheless pose an un
comfortable dilemma: either their respective tests for validity of Federal
Rules should be extended to a context-federal question cases-not con
sidered by them, or the Enablin g Act imposes no restrictions on supervi
s ory court rules in that context, at least no restrictions different from
those the Cons titution imposes on C o ngres s in the area of federal
procedure.64
For one brief but hopeful moment a few years ago, it appeared that
the Court would be required to reconsider i ts interpretation of the En
abling Act in a federal question case. In A1arek v. Chesny the Court of
Appeals had refused to interpret Rule 68 so as to deny pos t-offer attor
ney's fees to a prevailing civil rights plaintiff, relying alternatively on the
s tatute governing fees in such cases and on the Enabling Act.65 More
over, in an amicus brief the Solicitor General had referred to the legisla
tive history that the Court has never acknowledged, let alone discussed .
But the Court managed to sustain Rule 68 in Afarek with out reference to
the Enabling Act.66
West is of a piece with Marek, but it is worse. The Court asserted the
irrelevance of restrictions on its power to fashion federal common law for
s tate law diversity cases that had driven i ts decision in Walker v. Arm co Steel
Co . 67 Fair enough. But the Court had also said in Walker that those re
strictions were applicable only because Rule 3 does not as a matter of
.

6 1 See id. a t 1 1 06- 1 4 . 1 1 2 1 -27.
62 See supra note 5 2 and accompanyiPg text.
63 See Ely, supra note 57, at 725-38 . See also Burbank, supra note 3, at I 1 23 nn.495-96.
64 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 1 0. Dictum in a recent decision of the Court suggests that
view. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Wolff & Co., 1 08 S. Ct. 404, 4 1 3 (1987) (suggesting that the Court
could promulgate a valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure "authorizing service [of process] on an
alien in a federal-question case"). But see Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 72-73 n.673; Whitten, Separa
tion of PowersRestrictions on judicialRulemaking: A Case Study of FederalRule 4, 40 ME. L. REv. 4 1 ( 1 988) ;
infra note 186.
65 See Chesny v. Marek, 420 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1 983), reu"d, 473 U.S. 1 ( 1 985). The attorney's
fee statute at issue in Marek was the Civil Right's Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1 976, Pub. L. No.
94-559, 90 Stat. 264 1 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1 988 ( 1 982)).
66 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 ( 1 985); Bmbank Propo sals toAmendRu!.e68- Time toAbandon
Ship, 1 9 U . MICH. j.L. REF. 425, 433 n.42, 437-38 ( 1 986) .
67 Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740 ( 1 980).
When the underlying cause of action is based on state law, and federal jurisdiction is based
on diversity of citizenship, state law not only provides the appropriate period of limitations
but also determines whether service must be effected within that period. Walker v. Annco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 ( 1 980) . Respect for the State's substantive decision that
actual service is a component of the policies underlying the statute of limitations requires
that the service rule in a diversity suit "be considered part and parcel of the statute of
limitations . " !d. at 752 (footnote omitted) . This requirement, naturally, does not apply to
federal question cases. Indeed , Walker expressly declined to '"address the role of Rule 3 as
a tolling provision for a statute of limitations, whether set by federal iaw or borrowed from
state law, if the cause of action is based on federai iaw." !d. at 75 I n. ll.
West v. Conrail. l 07 S . Ct. 1538, 1 541 n.4 (1987).
,
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" plain meaning," and was not intended to, furnish what i t called a "toll
ing provision" for state statutes of limitations .68 With sleight of hand
that s till leaves me blinking, the Court in West supplied a different " plain
meaning" to Rule 3 for federal question cases 69 and did not consider the
Enabling Act problems that interpretation might be thought to present.
In particular, the Court did not consider the fact that the original Advi
sory Committee, in a Note which had been quoted in Walker, feared such
problems in both federal question and diversity cases. 70 One is left won
dering after West whether the Court believes that there are any res tric
tions on Federal Rules in federal question cases .
As this analysis may suggest, it is considerably less important that we
reach agreement about the implementation of the Enabling Act's restric
tions on supervisory court rulemaking than that we agree on C ongress'
purposes in imposing those restrictions . The question whether the
Enabling Act authorizes a Federal Rule defining when statutes of limita
tions , federal or state, stop running is a detail . Having failed to acknowl
edge the relevance of the Enabling Act in federal question cases, the
C ourt in West obviously did not consider that detail . If the C ourt had
reached the question, its answer might have turned on the answer to an
anterior ques tion: whether a test for validity implementing restrictions
allegedly imposed by Congres s for reas ons that are not pertinent in fed
eral question cases is plausible in such cases .7 1 If ins tead the Court had
turned to the Enabling Act's legislative history, it is most unlikely that
Rule 3 would have been sustained as a supplemental provision for stat
utes of limitations, federal or state. 7 2
68 See Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 & nn.9- l 0 ( 1 980) .
69 To be sure, the Court in Walker had left open the question of "the role of Rule 3 as a tolling
provision for a statute of limitations, whether set by federal law or borrowed fro m state law, if the
cause of action is based on federal law." 446 U.S. at 7 5 1 n.ll . But neither in Walker nor in West did
the Court explain how a Federal Rule can have two "plain meanings," and, as demonstrated below,
the drafting history of Rule 3 is to the contrary.
70 In Walker, the Court observed:
"Rule 3 simply provides that an action is commenced by filing the complaint and has as its
primary purpose the measuring of time periods that begin running from the date of com
mencement; the rule does not state that filing tolls the statute of limitations." 4 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1 057, p. l 9 1 ( 1 969) .
The Note of the Advisory Committee on the Rules states:
"When a Federal or State statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, a question may arise
under this rule whether the mere filing of the complaint stops the running of the statute, or
whether any further step is required, such as, service of the summons and complaint or
their delivery to the marshal for service. The answer to this question may depend on
whether it is competent for the Supreme Court, exercising the power to make rules of pro
cedure without affecting substantive rights, to vary the operation of statutes of limitations.
The requirement of Rule 4 (a) that the clerk shall forthwith issue the summons and deliver it
to the marshal for service will reduce the chances of such a question arising." 28 U.S.C.
App., pp. 394-395.
This Note establishes that the Advisory Committee predicted the problem which arose in
Ragan and arises again in the instant case. It does not indicate, however, that Rule 3 was
intended to serve as a tolling provision for statute of limitations purposes; it only suggests
that the Advisory Committee thought the rule might have that effect.
446 U.S. at 750 n. l O .
7 1 See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
72 See Burbank, supra note 3 , at 1 1 58-60.
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Court rules are not the only means by which the Supreme Court
makes federal law. In a case like Wes t , brought in federal court to adj udi
cate federal substantive claims , there is undoubtably federal power to
furnish all of the s u b sidiary rules , be they characterized a s subs tantive or
procedura1.'3 Whether, in the absence of explicit congressional provi
sion or direction, the federal courts have the power to furnish those rules
depends on one's approach to federal common law.
As regards subsidiary rules of substantive law and " [l] egal rules
which impact significantly upon the effectuation of legal rights , " 7 4 the
Court's approach seems to be that a finding of federal power usually en
tails a conclusion of federal j udicial power and that the question whether
federal law shall be uniform or shall consist of state law borrowed as
federal law is a matter of discretion. To be sure, in recent years the
Court has provided guidance on the exercise of that discretion, the pur
pose of which is to require more than mere rhetoric to justify the creation
or application of uniform judge-made rules. But, according to the Court,
the guidelines are entirely a j udicial construct.75
The Court has yet to articulate or demonstrate a coherent approach
to the common-law powers of federal courts for matters that, because
they do not involve rules of substantive law or rules that " impact signifi
cantly upon the effectuation of legal rights , " can without controversy be
deemed procedural . Hanna v. Plumer may suggest that federal courts are
free to formulate federal rules for, or apply them to, such matters , so
long as they do not run afoul of the restrictions applicable in state law
diversity cases . 7 6
My own view is that the Rules of Decision Act speaks directly to the
circumstances in which federal courts can fashion or apply federal j udge
made rules, however they are characterized. When state law is found to
apply, in a federal question case as well as in a state law diversity case,
that result follows not because of j udicial grace or borrowing, but be
cause Congress has directed it.
[T]here i s n o historical warrant for the suggestion that Erie 's constitu
tional holding exhausts the Rules of Decision Act, whatever confusion
about the reach of that holding may have followed in its wake. The Act
is not confined to cases in which state law governs " of its own force . "
Moreover, the language of the Act requires federal j udges to justify
federal common law by reference to a constitutional or s tatutory
source that either explicitly or implicitly authorizes - "provide s " for
- or implicitly and plausibly calls for - " requires" - its creation.77
7 3 See Hanna v . Plumer, 3 8 0 U.S. 4 6 0 , 4 7 1 -72 ( 1 965) . I assume, of course, that the substantive
law claims are within federal competence under the Constitution.
74 Burks v. Lasker, 44 1 U.S. 47 1 , 477 ( 1 979) .
7 5 See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v . Radcliff Materials, Inc., 45 1 U.S. 6 3 0 ( 1 98 1 ) ; United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc. , 4 4 0 U.S. 7 1 5 ( 1 979); Burbank, supra note 6 , at 755-62.
76 See Hanna , 380 U.S. at 466 (dictum); Burbank, supra note 6, at 787-9 1 .
7 7 Burbank, supra note 6, a t 759 (footnotes omitted) (criticizing United States v. Little Lake Mis
ere Land Co., 4 1 2 U.S. 580, 592-93 ( 1 9 73) and United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 7 1 5 ,
7 2 7 ( 1 979) ) . For the role of Federal Rules in fashioning federal common law under the Rules of
Decision Act, see id. at 772-75.
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REVIEW

I t is also mv
view that rec,e n t SuDrem:::
Court decisions on federal
'
l
common iaw, albeit not the C o u r t ' s inconsisten t and insupp o rtable statemen ts a bout the Rules of Decision Act, can be reconciled \Vith this ap
proach . 78 I ronically, the Court's roughest treatment of the Act occurred
in the De/Costello c a s e , where the Court made the limitations borrowing
from th e Nati o nal Labor Rela tions Act that led to the subsidiary ques tion
posed in West , 79 Confronted with an inflexible view of the Rules o f Deci
sion Ac t ' s dire c ti o n to apply state law in

J u s ti c e

S tevens ' dis sent,80 the

DelCostello maj ority effectively read it out of federal question cases . 8 1 As I
have previously o bs erv e d

,

[The] sugge s tion [that the Act is confined to diversity cases] finds no
support in the language of the Act, in history, or in the Court' s own
fumblings with the Act in nondiversity cases . The fact that considera
tions requiring application of state law in diversity cases are not rele
vant to the elaboration of a federal legislative scheme tells us nothing
about the relevance of the Rules of Decision Act in the latter contex t .
Similarly, t h e fact that " neither Erie nor t h e Rules o f Decision A c t can
now be taken as establishing a mandatory rule that we apply s tate law in
federal inters tices" does not answer the question whether the Act
speaks to the circumstances when the filling of those interstices with
judge-made federal law is permissible.8 2

DelCostello thus set the s tage for West in more ways than one. Reading
those two cases, one might think that neither the Rules of D ecision Act
nor the Rules Enabling Act cons trains the Supreme Court when it makes
law for federal question cases - either in the common-law mode or pro
spectively - total victory for myths of federali s m .
Y e t a view of t h e Rules of Decision A c t that is n o t " crabbed or
wooden"83 comfortably yields the same conclusion in

De/Costello

as does

traditional federal common law analysis : when federal s u b s tantive rights
are put at risk by a sys tem of borrowed s tate law, the subs tantive scheme
requires " o therwise" than that s tate laws apply . 84

As

I

hope to have

demons trated, federal substantive rights are put at risk by a regime of
borrowed s tate limitations law.

The possibility of inadvertent loss of

those rights alone supports uniform rules, and the o ther costs of b or
rowed s tate limitations law may als o , Due attention to the separation of
powers constraints on common-law courts prompts the federal courts to
find plausible al ternatives in other federal s tatutes, and they s o metimes
reach to do s o . 85
78 See id. at 758-62 .
79 See De!Costelio v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. I 51 ( 1 98 3 ) ; supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
80 See De/Costello , 462 U.S. at 1 72-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting) .
8 1 See id. a t 1 59 n. l 3.
82 Burbank, supra note 6, at 760 (footnotes omitted). See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs ., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2 759, 2 7 7 1 n.2 (Scalia, J . , concurring) .
8 3 Robertson v. Wegmann, 4 3 6 U.S. 584, 5 9 8 ( 1 978) (Biackmun, J . , dissenting ) .
84 Cf. Burks v. Lasker, 44 1 U.S. 47 1 , 479 n.6 ( 1 979) (situations in which "the very application of
varying state laws would itself be inconsistent with federal interests"); Burbank, supra note 6, at 7657 1 (preclusion law for federal question judgments of federal courts ) .
85 See supra text accompanying notes 1 3-30.
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Why, then, is the problem with West not of merely academic inter··
est?86 If the C ourt could have formulated a valid common law rule for
federal question cases involving borrowed l i mi tations periods, why quib 
ble about its imputation of such a provision to Rule 3 ?
First, I d o not believe that ques tions o f technique are or should b e of
concern only to academics , at leas t when the lawmaking powers of fed
eral courts are concerned . Even if analysis reveals that the Court could
have reached the same result in West as a matter of federal common law,
we still should be concerned about the possibility that the Court regards
the Rules Enabling Act as irrelevant in federal question cases . For we
now know that existing Federal Rules can have two plain meanings .
What is to prevent the Court in the future from promulgating Federal
Rules for application only in federal question cases ? Indeed, that is a
pos sibility the Advisory Committee is exploring in connection with Rule
487 and one that should be explored generally by those who are inter
ested in reexamining the no tion of trans-substantive procedure, the no
tion that the same rules of procedure should , or can appropriately, apply
across the whole spectrum of substantive law .88 As prospectively formu
lated procedure is more closely tied to the substan tive law, however,
both the viability and the importance of effective restrictions on court
rulemaking should become more apparent.89
Second, it is not at all clear that the Court could have formulated a
valid common law rule identical in scope of application to the scope its
decision in West accorded Rule 3. To be sure, in cases that, there being
no pertinent Federal Rule, would be treated like West , or rather as West
should have been treated-a garden variety federal common-law case
the only formal legal barriers under the Court's approach are constitu
tional .90 There is undoubted federal power and also, it would seem, fed
eral j udicial power to fashion a rule defining a limitations period in
federal question cases, whatever the source of that limitations period.
The scope given to Rule 3 in West was not confined to cases like West,
however. The Court's opinion suggests that Rule 3's limitations function
extends to cases under 42 U .S.C. Section 1 98 8 , a statute similar to the
Rules of Decision Act but m ore narrowly focused and h ence not as easy
to ignore or wish away.9 1 Moreover, it is precisely cases subj ect to sec86 See supra text accompanying note 46.
87 See Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Ruf£s: The Summons , 63 NOTRE DAME L. R Ev . 733
(1988 ) . See also supra note 64 ; infra note 186.
88 See infra text accompanying notes 170-89.
89 See infra text accompanying notes 151-53, 183-89.
90 See supra text accompanying note 75. In addition to constitutional restraints on federal law
making by Congress, at some point - a point that is not reached if the Rules of Decision Act is taken
seriously - constitutional restraints on federal lawmaking by the federal courts are implicated. See
Burbank, supra note 6, at 756-57 n.l02.
9 1 See West v. Conrail, 107 S. Ct. 1538, 1541 (1987}, quoted supra note 44; id . at 1542 n.6;
DelRaine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 1987) .
Section 1988 provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the
provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES, " for the
protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication,
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as
such laws are suitable t o carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not
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tion 1 98 8 that have caused t h e Court to articulate the p ercep cion that
limitations p eriods are not as simple as they may appear and thus t o ex
tend its borrowing from state law to supplementary rules.92 One may
treat this aspect of West a s dictum, but i t has the appearance of dictum
intended to b e a cted upon as if it were holding. One may also observe
that the Court has hardly been more consistent or clear in its treatmen t
of Section 1 988 th a n o f the Rules o f Decision Act . 9 3 Let that person try,
without relying on Rule 3 , to reach West 's result under the s ta t u t e in all
cases to which it applies, but do not hold your breath .
Finally, on the ques tion of validity, the reasoning of the C ourt's deci
sion in West extends to all federal question cases, including those in
which there is a directly applicable federal limitations period.94 Cases in
which the period is not further defined by a statutory rule present no
problem for a judge-made rule under traditional federal common-law
analysis, or for that matter under the Rules of Decision Act. But what of
cases in which the federal statute carries its own provision defining when
the period ceases to run ? Paul Carrington has suggested that the Court
will not permit the application of Rule 3 in such cases,95 but I am not
sure that I understand why. If a Federal Rule is valid, it s up ersedes pre
viously enacted federal statutes with which it is inconsistent.96 Perhaps
Rule 3 has three plain meanings . In any event, apart fro m Rule 3, it is
adapted to the object, o r are deficient in t h e provisions necessary t o furnish suitable reme
dies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposi
tion of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the
party found guilty. In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 198 1 ,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 , the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 u.s.c. § 1988 ( 1982) .
92 See supra text accompanying note 36.
[T]he cases that require federal courts to borrow the whole state statute of limitations and
not just the limitations period . . . are best explained not by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (although they
were civil rights cases to which section 1988 applies and they did rely in part on that statute)
but by the inseparability of the time period itself from some (though not necessarily all)
other provisions of a state's limitations law . . . . The actual generosity of a statute of limita
tions depends not only on the nominal period within which suit must be brought but on
provisions allowing that period to be extended for various reasons, so that if the federal
court borrows just the period it may in fact be giving plaintiffs more or less time than the
state that enacted the borrowed statute would have thought appropriate in the
circumstances.
DelRaine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
93 See Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1 9 88, 1 33 U. PA.
L. REv. 60 1 ( 1985) . But see id. at 620; infra text accompanying note I l l .
94 The Court's stated holding was limited to cases in which "the absence of an express federal
statute of limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute." West
v. Conrail, 1 07 S. Ct. 1 538, 1 54 1 ( 1 987) . See supra note 44. But unless Rule 3 has multiple plain
meanings in federal question cases, it furnishes a subsidiary limitations rule in all such cases. That
appears to have been the expectation of the Court in Walker. See Walker v. Armco S teel Corp . , 446
U.S. 740, 75 1 n. l l ( l980) , quoted supra note 69.
95 See P. Carrington, supra note 37, at 27-28.
96 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 ( 1982 ) , quoted supra note 48; Burbank, supra note 66, at 4 3 7 . O f course, if
the hypothetical statute had been enacted after 1938, the year Rule 3 became effective, it would
control.
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clear that the Court could n o t apply a judge-made rule inconsistent with
a pertinent and valid federal statutory provision.
Third, whatever the C ourt ' s concep tion of its common-law powers
or of the res trictions placed on those powers by Section 1 988, I doubt
that, if it had approached the ques tion on a case-by-case basis, which is
to say statute-by-statute, the Court would have reached the results
portended by West . One who regards criticism of West as academic may
be viewing that cas e as another example of borrowing, what I have else
where called reverse incorporation : the use of a Federal Rule in its sub
stantive aspects as the basis for federal common law .97 Apart from the
fundamental problem that a federal common-law rule of similar scope of
application might be invalid, West furnishes ample proof of the dangers
of that technique. For, although the drafting history of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure indicates that the Reporter and some members of the
Advisory Committee wished that Rule 3 could furnish a rule to stop the
running of limitations periods , it also is replete with evidence of contro
versy on that question,9 8 controversy that led to the compromise Advi
sory Committee Note so prominent in the Court' s decision in Walker and
so conspicuously ignored in West . 99 In all of this , I can find not the
slightes t hint that, in formulating Rule 3, the Advisory Committee was
relying on case law that identified the filing of the complaint as the ap
propriate event for a federal statute of limitations. Indeed, if the
rulemakers had been seeking guidance in the cases , they would have
found a different rule. 1 0o
Of course, much has changed since those old cases were decided,
especially arrangements for service of federal process . Consideration of
those changes and of lower court cases treating the problem might have
led the Court to the result it reached, and to the results it signalled, in
West . In fact, the lower court cases provide little sustenance, 1 0 1 and,
although the Court did rely on a Federal Rule governing service of pro
cess in West , the move was part of the sleight of hand to which I have
referred. 1 0 2 When the matter is properly analyzed, additional doubts
arise about West from the perspective of federal common law.
The federal statute from which the limitations period was borrowed
in West requires not only that a charge be filed with the General C ounsel
of the NLRB within six months but that it be s eroed on the subj ect of the
complaint within that period. 1 0 3 In defending the use of Rule 3 instead
of the borrowed statute' s service rule, the Court in West resorted to a
trick it has found useful before, artificially parsing a statute of limitations
into limitations and service provisions . 1 04 In this case, according to the
97 See Burbank, supra note 3 , at 1 1 58-63 .
98 See id. at 1 1 59-60 n.6 1 9 .
99 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
1 00 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 62 & n.633.
1 0 1 See, e.g. , Sentry Corp. v . Harris, 802 F.2d 2 29 (7th Cir. 1 986) , cert. denied, 1 07 S . Ct. 1 624
( 1 987); United States v . Wahl, 583 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1 9 78); Bomar v . Keyes, 1 62 F.2d 1 36 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 ( 1 947).
1 02 See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
1 03 29 u.s.c. § 1 60(b) ( 1 982).
1 04 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 462-63 n. l ( 1 965) ; Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 73-76.
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Court, the s ervice pro vis ion in the s ta t u t e could be disregarded because

Rule

4 U) 1 05

g o verns that subjec t . 1 06

Rule 4 (j ) , which is a s tatute , 1 07 does not, and was n o t intended t o ,

I

Drovide a rule affecting limi tations periods . 1 08 The statu t o rv s ervice re

quirement

that the Court declined to borrow in West canno � reasonably

b e regarded as anything o ther than such a rul e . 1 09 The result reached in

West transmogrifies a six-month limitations period into a ten-month pe
Even acknowled ging irreducible arbitrariness in limitations law ,

riod .

that l ooks like dis tortion. If s o , it would be dis tortion somewhat different

from the distortion that, in cases under Section

1 98 8 ,

has prompted the

C o urt' s refusal to borrow piecemeal . 1 1 0 In those cas e s , selective borrow
ing may lead to dis tortion of state law, the s o urce to whic h , at least on

this s ubject, the C ourt is directed by the s tatute and from which it is em

powered to depart only if the borrowed rules dis criminate agai n s t or

would cau s e distortion in federal law, the des tination . 1 1 1 I n a case like
West , 1 1 2 one need only b e concerned about the latter type o f dis tortio n .

T h e Court in West failed satisfactorily to explain, however, why the ten
m onth limitations period emerging from its combination of Rules

3

and

4 U ) s erves the policies that caused i t to b orrow the six-month limitation

period in the first place. 1 1 3 The common-law method might a t least have
SuMMONS: TIME LIMIT FOR SERVICE. If a service of the summons and complaint is not
made upon a defendant within 1 20 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on
whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not
made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without preju
dice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion. This subdivi
sion shall not apply to service in a foreign country pursuant to subdivision (i) of this rule.
FED. R . CIY. P. 4 U ) .
1 06 The only gap in federal law that w e intended t o fill i n DelCostello was the appropriate
limitations period. We did not intend to replace any part of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure with any part of § 1 O(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. Rule 3 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a civil actin is commenced b y filing a com
plaint with the court, and Rule 4 governs the procedure for effecting service and the period
within which service must be made . . . .
West v . Conrail, 107 S . Ct. 1 538, 1 54 1 ( 1 98 7 ) . See id. at 1 542 n.7 ("Respondents also argue that
§ 1 O (b)'s service requirement must be adopted in order to assure that defendants receive prompt
notice of suit against them. The requirement of timely service in Rule 4U) satisfied this need without
recourse to the service requirement of § l O(b) " ) .
1 07 Rule 4U) was added by P.L. No. 97-462, § 2, 96 Stat. 2527, 2528 ( 1 983).
1 0 8 See 1 28 CoNe. REc. H9850 (daily e d . Dec. 1 5, 1 982) (rtmarks o f Rep. Edwards) . Because
there are no committee reports, this analysis by the bill's sponsor should be accorded great weight.
1 09 See 29 U.S.C. § l 60(b) ( 1 982), quoted supra note 40.
1 1 0 See supra text accompanying notes 36 & 9 1 -92.
I l l See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U . S . 650, 660-6 1 ( 1 983 ) ; Kreimer, supra note 93, at 620.
1 1 2 When required to displace state law, federal j udges have the power to fashion a substitute
that is fully adequate in light of all of the policies and interests that a common law court
would consider in making law to govern a matter. They need not blind themselves to the
procedural opportunities afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . . But, at the
same time, they should not confuse stated opportunities with stated requirements . . . .
Burbank, supra note 6, at 7 7 1 (footnotes omitted ) . See id. at 766-67.
1 1 3 While it is possible that a defendant will not be served with the complaint until ten
months after the cause of action accrues, this result is not inconsistent with our adoption of
a six-month statute of limitations for breach of contract, breach of duty of fair representa
tion claims. See DelCostelio v. Teamsters, 462 U . S . 1 5 1 ( 1 983) . The administrative scheme for
unfair labor practices only requires that the charge be filed and served within six months of
the date the cause of action accrued. The defendant does not receive the complaint, if any,
until the General Counsel has investigated the charge and decided to proceed. Under both
the administrative procedure for unfair labor practices and the judicial procedure for hybrid
1 05

j
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evoked more

attention to the problem, 1 14 as it might have prompted
awarenes s of other problems that flow from the Court's reliance on Fed
eral Rules in this c o n t e x t .
Notwithstandin g the possibility of dis tortion of subs tantive law, a
uniform and trans-substantive federal common-law rule might be justi
fi e d if such a rule mitigated the administrability problems, for litigants
and courts , of the sys tem of borrowed limitations law. But such a justifi
cation is n o t clear in a case like West and, it would seem, in s ome of the
other cases within the reach of its reasoning if not its holding. The cases
in question involve borrowed limitations periods found in s tatutes that
also contain rules providing when the periods cease to run. 1 1 5 In such
cases, the existence of the rule in the s ame statute as the governing limi
tations period should prevent the inadvertent loss of federal rights by
any litigant whose lawyer was consulted in time to comply. The possibil
ity that a trans-substantive j udge-made rule requiring only filing of a
complaint might preserve even a few meritorious claims from inadvertent
loss is important. Moreover, a trans-substantive common-law rule re
quiring only fi l ing would not be difficult to remember once it was
learned. But the resulting melange of legal sources might seem more
complicated, a perception that could impose costs of its own. 1 1 6 If so,
reliance on Rule 3, with its multiple plain meanings , 1 1 7 does not s olve the
problem.
claims, the statute of limitations and the tolling provisions extinguish stale claims; they
guarantee that the defendant is not subject to suit for conduct that occurred more than six
months before the complaining party initiates appropriate legal process, by filing either a
charge with the NLRB or a complaint in federal court.
West v. Conrail, 1 07 S. Ct. 1 538, 1 54 2 n.7 ( 1 987) (emphasis in original ) . As noted by the court of
appeals in West:
While it is true, as Judge Gibbons notes, that the complaint in an unfair labor practice
proceeding is filed by the General Counsel after an investigation of the employee's charge,
it is the filing and service of the charge that notifies the employer of the charge and initiates the dispute
resolution process in such a proceeding. The filing and service of the complaint performs the

same function in a hybrid labor suit like the one before us. Section I O(b) promotes the
prompt resolution of labor disputes by requiring an early initiation of the dispute resolution
process and DelCostello teaches that this policy should be implemented in hybrid labor suits
as well. That policy is best served by borrowing the service requirement, as well as the
filing requirement, of Section 1 O(b).
West v . Conrail, 780 F.2d 3 6 1 , 363-64 (3d Cir. 1 985) (emphasis added), rev 'd, 1 0'7 S . Ct. 1 538
( 1 987). See also infra note 1 1 4 .
1 1 4 I n American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 823 F.2d 4 6 6 ( 1 1 th Cir.
1 987), the court of appeals borrowed the three-month limitations period in the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C.§ 1 2 ( 1 982), to govern a suit to vacate an arbitration award that was brought under the
Postal Reorganization Act of 1 970, Pub. L. No. 9 1 -375, 84 Stat. 7 1 9 ( 1 970) (codified in relevant part
at 39 U.S.C. § 1 208(b) ( 1 982)). Although th� Federal Arbitration Act requires service of a notice of
motion to vacate within the three-month period, the court of appeals felt compelled by West to reject
the borrowing of that subsidiary rule:
Whatever our doubts about adding an additional four months onto a three-month (or even
six-month) limitations period specifically chosen for its brevity, that decision is no longer
ours to make. Therefore, if the plaintiff filed its complaint to commence the action within
three months (which it did) , and effected proper service within 1 20 days of filing (which it
did) , then the actions are timely.
823 F.2d at 477 (footnotes omitted).
1 1 5 See, e.g., id.
1 1 6 It might not, however, be more complicated.
1 1 7 See supra text accompanying notes 67-70, 94-97.
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If anyone continues to doubt that technique matters , a few minutes
with a recent Fourth Circuit decision shouid do the trick. Whatever re
s trictions the Enabling Act imposes on Federal Rules in federal court, I
hope we can agree that neither the Enabling Act 1 1 8 nor the Federal Rules
themselves 1 1 9 authorize their imposition on s tate courts . If the C ourt in
West had thought of that and adverted to the fact that most federal claims
are within the concurrent jurisdiction of s tate courts, it should also have
realized that Rule 3 was not a panacea on the question before it. Because
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in state c ourt litiga
tion, only a uniform federal common-law rule, binding on state courts as
well as federal, can yield true uniformity. Here again, however, l ooking
at the problem from the perspective of federal common law raises doubts
whether uniformity, let alone trans-substantive uniformity, is all that it
appears .
The plaintiff in Cannon v. Kroger Co. 1 20 sued her employer and her
union in a hybrid section 30 I! unfair representation action in s tate court.
As permitted under North Carolina law, she commenced that action on
the last day of the six-month period not by filing a complaint, but by the
issuance of a summons upon her application "stating the nature and pur
pose of the action and requesting permission to file [her] complaint
within 20 days" and a court order " stating the nature and purpose of the
action and granting the reques ted permis sion . " 1 2 1 After removal of the
action to federal court, the district judge dismissed it as barred by the
(borrowed) six-month limitations period. On appeal, a panel of the
C ourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plain
tiff ' s failure to file a "complaint" in accordance with Rule 3 within the
six-month period was fatal. 1 22 Rehearing and rehearing en bane were
denied, 1 2 3 with judge Murnaghan writing a lengthy and vigorous
dissent. 1 2 4
1 1 8 See supra note 48. The Federal Rules there authorized are for "the district courts and courts
of appeals of the United States. "
1 1 9 These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in a l l suits of a civil
nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the exceptions
stated in Rule 8 1 . They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 . .
1 20 832 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1 987}, reh 'g and reh 'g en bane denied, 837 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1 988) .
1 2 1 N.C. R. C1v. P. 3 . See Cannon, 832 F.2d at 304.
1 22 After West, there can be no question that commencement of a "hybrid" claim brought in
district court is to be assessed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Unlike appellant, we can perceive no justification for allowing a different result simply be
cause the underlying action is initiated in a state court. The substantive rights involved
remain purely federal in nature. Moreover, the choice of a forum in no way diminishes the
subtle balance of interests noted in De/Costello as a justification for uniformity. The applica
tion of alternative state law procedures must inevitably intrude into the balance and
threaten the goal of uniform adjudication. We conclude, therefore, that the statute of limi
tations applicable to hybrid actions runs until the action is properly commenced under the
dictates of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Cannon , 832 F.2d at 305-06. One member of the panel dissented. See id. at 306-07 (Smalkin, D J . ,
dissenting) .
1 23 Cannon v. Kroger Co., 837 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1 988).
1 24 !d. at 660-70 (Murnaghan, J . , dissenting from denial of rehearing en bancl .
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The Court o f Appeals' decision in Cannon i s remarkable not so much
for imposing Rule 3 on a state court, as for imposing Rule 8 (a) , which
defines what a "pleading which sets forth a claim for relief" in federal
court shall contain. 1 25 Whatever its power in other cases of borrowed
limitations law, the Court in West had the power to fashion a uniform
common-law rule for the hybrid federal claims at issue in that case, and
its reliance on Rule 3 can be excused as shorthand. 1 2 6 Moreover, it
would not do to have one rule defining when a federal limitations period
stops running for cases brought in federal court and a consequentially
different rule for cases brought in state court. The Court also has the
power, although it has been reluctant to use it, to displace state-law rules
in state court litigation on federal claims when those rules are hostile to
or inconsistent wi th a scheme of federal rights . 1 2 7 In that aspect of Can
non , the Fourth Circuit can be seen as merely extending the Court' s
shorthand reference t o Rule 3 .
Accepting the proposition that the Court could fashion a uniform
rule for hybrid actions , binding in state as well as federal court, the ques
tion becomes whether it could also require that the paper filed within the
statutory period, which Rule 3 calls a " complaint," satisfy the require
ments of Rule 8 . That is the effect of Cannon . 1 2 8 This result is difficult if
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain ( l ) a short and plain
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it,
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and
(3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative or of
several different types may be demanded.
FED. R. C1v. P. 8 (a).
1 26 See supra text following note 89.
1 27 See, e. g. , Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 ( 1 980); Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R . R . , 342
U.S. 359 ( 1 952); Brown v. Western Ry. , 338 U.S. 294 ( 1 949); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U . S . 22 ( 1 923).
See also Burbank, supra note 6, at 805- 1 7. In displacing particular state-law rules, or requiring use of
a uniform federal common-law rule, in state court litigation, the Court is bound by the Rules of
Decision Act. See id . at 809 n .366; supra note 8 .
After this paper was delivered, the Supreme Court decided two cases that bear on the problem
of federal law in state court. One of them, Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 1 08 S. Ct.
1 837 ( 1 988) , held that the availability of prejudgment interest in a state court FELA action is a
matter of federal law. The other, Felder v. Casey, l 08 S. Ct. 2302 ( 1 988), held that a state notice of
claim statute could not be applied in a state court § 1 983 action. Felder is of particular interest
because, although using the language of "preemption , " see id. at 2307, it confirms the potential of
the general approach to federal common law that I have advocated. See Burbank, supra note 6. Felder
thus also suggests the bankruptcy of the Court's approach to the full faith and credi t statute. See id.
at 805-22.
1 28 Appellant's alternative contention that the state summons issued pursuant to North Caro
lina Rule 3 was somehow equivalent to a complaint under the Federal rules is unpersuasive.
A valid complaint under the Federal Rules must satisfy, inter alia, the demands of Rule
8(a) (2) by including a "plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." The state summons issued to defendants below fell significantly short of this
requirement.
Cannon v. Kroger, 832 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir. 1 987) (footnote omitted) , reh 'g and reh 'g en bane denied,
837 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1 988). In referring to the "state summons," the court of appeals evidently
intended the "Application and Order Extending Time to File Complaint," which was served with the
summons. Ms. Cannon's application stated as the nature and purpose of the action: "Recovery of
damages and other relief by employee for Union's breach of its duty of fair represen tation and em
ployer's breach of collective bargaining agreement under Section 30 l of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1 85 . " Application and Order Extending Time to File Complaint, Can
non v. Kroger, No. 86-CVS- 1 1 76 (March 7, 1 986) .
1 25
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impossible to square with the Court' s traditional approach to federai
common law and radically inconsistent with the Court ' s approach to fed
eral law in state courts , which has been largely sui generis . 1 29
For good or ill, West makes it clear that actual notice to a defendant
within the limitations period is not important to the policies of the (bor
rowed) statute of limitations. 1 30 M s . Cannon filed her complaint within
20 days , and it was served on the defendants within 30 days , of the issu
ance of the summons . The defendants therefore had notice of the claims
brought against them long before they might have had notice if the ac
tion had been brought originally in federal court, where Rule 4 U ) allows
1 2 0 days for service of process . 1 3 1 In that light, the precise content of
the filed paper that commences the lawsuit is irrelevant. U nder tradi
tional federal common law analysis or a Rules of Decision Act approach,
there is not a sufficient basis to displace the North Carolina system, let
alone to impose on North Carolina courts a uniform federai definition of
a complaint. 1 3 2 Moreover, the administrability costs of such a rule for
people desiring to litigate in s tate court are significant. 1 3 3 U nder a
" preemption" approach, a uniform federal rule can only be harder to
justify . 1 34
Just as visions of uniformity may have blinded the Court in Wes t , s o
may they have prevented the C ourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
from seeing the endpoint of the course on which it embarked. Imposing
the requirements of Rules 3 and 8 on state courts will not ensure uni
formity in the limitations period applicable to a federal claim . Conceiva
bly, a state might permit a period longer than 120 days for service of
process . If so, it is possible that the Supreme Court would require that a
s tate court plaintiff follow Federal Rule 4 U ) . Is it not more likely that the
Court would look to the facts to determine whether notice was given so
late as to be inconsistent with the policies of the governing l imitations
period? If so, Ms. Cannon would have additional reason to wonder what
happened to her.
Whatever the accuracy of a would-be reformer's description of fed
eral practice and procedure under the Conformity Act, there can b e no
doubt that to " the average lawyer," federal limitations law today "is San
skrit. " 1 35 Nor can there be any doubt that, notwithstanding the S up reme
not

1 29 See Burbank, supra note 6, at 805- 1 7 ; supra note 1 27 .
1 30 See supra text accompanying notes 1 03- 1 4 .
1 3 1 See Cannon, 837 F .2d at 66 1 & n.3 (Murnagham, J . , dissenting from denial of rehearing en
bane) . See also id. at 662 n.4, 666 & n . 1 1 .
1 3 2 See id. a t 663-64, 666-68. Cf Burbank. supra note 6 , a t 8 1 0- 1 2 (uniform federal preclusion
rules for state court judgments not justified).
1 33 See Cannon, 837 F.2d at 668 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) .
The problem is not, however, confined to litigants who fear that their state court action may be
removed to federal court and for that reason attempt " to comply with both sets of rules . " /d. As
Judge Murnaghan elsewhere demonstrates, removal is irrelevant. See id. at 664; FED. R. Crv. P. 8 1 .
The panel opinion in Cannon represents that court's conclusion as to the law applicable in a case
litigated wholly within the state court system and, implicitly, its prediction of what the Supreme
Court would hold in reviewing a state court decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1 25 7 ( 1 982). See supra note
! 2 2 ; note 1 27 and accompanying text. Cf Burbank, supra note 6, at 8 1 1 - 1 2 (administrability
problems of uniform federal preclusion rules for state court judgments).
1 34 See Burbank, supra note 6, at 807- 1 0; supra note 1 27 .
1 35 See supra text accompanying notes 1 -4 .

\

I

I
i

r
I
f

r
1
l

r

988]

RULES AND DISCRETION

713

:::: o urt's efforts to reduce the costs entailed by a system o f borro·wed state
imitations law, truly effective reform will c o m e , if at all, only when Con
�ress determines comprehensively to address the problem. For, even an
�xpansive view of the common-law powers of federal courts confronts
:ontinuing concern about charges of "j udicial legislation" i 36 that, in an
1rea of irreducible arbitrariness, cannot be answered by reference to leg
siative policies. And not even the Court that decided West is likely to
�ssay limitations periods in Federal Rules .
S tudying the Supreme Court' s responses to the problem is nonethe
,ess ins tructive. We see in those responses a quest for simplicity and pre
:lictability, and for adj udication of claims on the merits, that recalls the
�tated goals of those who sought to replace the Conformity Act with
::ourt rules of practice and procedure. l 3 7 We also see a quest for uni
formity, one that is much easier to understand and defend than the simi
lar quest of proponents of the Enabling Act, 1 3 8 because it concerns only
federal substantive claims and, moreover, matters bearing so directly on
those claims as to " define or limit" 1 39 their very existence. Finally, in
West , we see the triumph of the trans-substantive solution, discovered in
that compendium of trans-substantive solutions known as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Supreme C ourt's responses to the problem of fed eral limita
tions law thus follow the plot line of modern federal procedure. I have
asked you to pay close attention to the last chapter, because it is, I be
lieve, the most important. In moving from a goal of uniformity to a re
sult of trans-substantive uniformity, the Court in West offered no more
explanation of why one must accompany the other than did those who
gave us the F ederal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 4 0 Even in the substantive
1 36 UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U . S . 696, 702-04 ( 1 966). See supra text accompanying
notes 6, 23-26.
1 3 7 The 1 926 Senate report on the bill that, with the change of one word, was ultimately passed as
the Rules Enabling Act of 1 934, enumerated the general purposes of the grant of rulemaking power
to the Supreme Court as follows:
First, to make uniform throughout the United States the forms of process, writs, plead
ings, and motions and the practice and procedure in the district courts in actions at law. It
is believed that if this were its only advantage that [sic] lawyers and litigants would find, in
uniformity alone, a tremendous advance over the present system.
Second, these general rules, if wisely made, would be a long step toward simplicity, a
most desirable step in view of the chaotic and complicated condition which now exists.
Third, it would tend toward the speedier and more intelligent disposition of the issues
presented in law actions and toward a reduction in the expense of litigation.
Fourth, it would make it more certain that if a plaintiff has a cause of action he would
not be turned out of court upon a technicality and without a trial upon the very merits o f
the case; and, likewise, if the defendant had a just defense h e would not b e denied b y any
artifice of [sic] the opportunity to present it.
S . R EP No. 1 1 74, 69th Cong., 1 st Sess . 1-2 ( 1 926) . See, e g., Report of the Committee on Unifonn judicial
Procedure, 6 A.B.A. J. 509 ( 1 920); Burbank, supra note 3 , at 1 067-68 & n.236; Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective , 1 35 U . PA. L. REv.
909, 948- 6 1 ( 1 987).
1 38 See supra note 1 37.
1 39 S. REP. No. 1 1 74, supra note 1 37, at 1 0 (quoting 3 REPORT OF THE BoARD OF STATUTORY
CoNSOLIDATION ON THE SIMPLIFICATION OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK 477
( 1 9 1 5) ) ; Burbank, supra note 3 , at 1 1 2 2 .
1 4 0 See Burbank, supra note 3 , a t 1 1 35-36 & n.539. The debate chronicled there concerned the
meaning of "general rules" as used in the Enabling Act, see supra note 48, and in particular whether
.
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context that brough t it forth, the trans-sub s tantive solution is problem
atic in terms of the poli cies animating the governing substantive law . 1 4 1
Moreover, although the benefit s of si mplicity and predictability afforded
by a trans-substantive solution migh t be thought to outweigh the cos ts of
any distortion, it is not clear that West 's solution promises those benefits
for federal court litigation, 142 and it surely does not when extended to
s tate court litigation . 1 43
Perhaps, however, I am being unfair, and we are or should be talking
about different books. Limitations law has always been difficult to char
acterize, 1 44 and its substantive implications are hard to miss , if not to
ignore. 1 45 In addition, Rule 3 , as interpreted in West , makes a clear pol
icy choice that has predictable consequences for a s tatute of limita
tions . 1 4 6 Further s till, the administrability costs of borrowed law are
obvious and perhaps different in kind from comparable costs in a system
that, by and large, eschews borrowing. 1 4 7 What can we learn from West
about real procedure , about "adj ective law ?" 1 48 Moreover, what can we
learn from that case about really uniform federal procedure ?
An answer to s ome of these possible obj ections to the comparison
lies in West itself, where the Supreme Court manifested no interest in the
question of characterization posed by the Enabling Act. A more satisfac
tory answer lies in a perception that may help to explain the Court's fail
ure to pause: the perception " that 'procedure' and 'substance' are
elusive words that must be approached in context, and that there can be
no one, indeed any, bright line to mark off their respective preserves . " 1 4 9
In much of today's litigation landscape, procedure is adj ectival to sub
s tantive law in the same way that, in negligence law, reasonable is to
man. 1 50 In other words, "real procedure" is hard to find .
Possible obj ections based on the atypical nature of Rule 3 , read to
make a policy choice in the limitations area, or on the supposedly unique
the Act contemplated uniformity or would accommodate rules requiring strict conformity to state
law. The question whether uniformity necessarily entails trans-substantive uniformity was not ad
dressed, probably because it was assumed. See Subrin, supra note 1 3 7, at 956-6 1 , 995-96.
1 4 1 See supra text accompanying notes 1 03- 1 3 . The problem of distortion is even more serious
when Rule 3 is used for other statutory limitation periods. See supra note 1 1 4 .
1 4 2 See supra text accompanying notes 1 1 5- 1 7 .
1 4 3 See supra note 1 3 3 and accompanying text.
1 4 4 Compare Goad v . Celotex Corp . , 8 3 1 F . 2 d 508, 5 1 1 (4th Cir. 1 987), cert. denied, 1 08 S . C t . 287 1
( 1 988) ("principal purpose of limiting statutes is the prevention of stale claims [from the perspective
of courts] , and . . . the repose of defendants is merely an incidental benefit. . . . ") with F . jAMES & G.
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4 . 1 6, at 2 1 8- 1 9 (3d ed. 1 985) (ordering " (p]rotection of a defendant
from stale claims" and " (p]rotection of defendant from insecurity" ahead of "[p]rotection of courts
fro m the burden of stale claims" in policy analysis).
1 4 5 See supra text accompanying notes 67-72,
1 46 See id. ; Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 60.
1 4 7 But see FED. R. Civ. P. 64, 69; Burbank, supra note 3 , at 1 145-4 7 .
1 4 8 "Law reformers have long assured u s that procedure i s technical, details-in short, adjective
law. Whatever the accuracy of those labels as to other matters, only in Wonderland do they describe
rules of preclusion." Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment on Marrese, 70
CoRNELL L. REv. 658, 662 ( 1 985) (footnote omitted).
1 49 Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 88.
1 50 See, e.g., Burbank, The Costs of Complexiiy (Book Review) , 85 MIC H . L. REv. 1 463, 1 4 7 1 -76
( 1 987).
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adminis trability problems o f a system o f borrowed law are more interest
ing, but not for reasons that those tempted to make them migh t think.
I t is not surprising that, with s ome notable exceptions, the trend of
modern procedural law has b een away from rules that make policy
choices towards those that confer on trial courts a substantial amount of
normative discretion . 1 5 1 For once one has settled upon trans-substantive
rules as the best way of achieving uniformity, simplicity and predictabil
ity, and once one acknowledges the impact of procedure on the subs tan
tive law, concerns about either the legitimacy of the enterpris e 1 52 or its
efficacy 1 53 push in that direction. Moreover, in a system dominated, as
modem American procedure has been dominated, by equity, l 54 the
avoidance of prospective policy choices holds the promise that justice
may be done, with procedure its servant rather than master. 1 55
Federal Rules that avoid policy choices and that in essence chart ad
hoc decision-making by trial j udges are uniform and hence trans-sub
stantive in only the most trivial sense. 1 5 6 More important, the banner of
simplicity and predictability under which they fly 1 5 7 is by now false adver
tising. There is little that is simple or predictable about contemporary
federal procedure. Litigants and courts need more guidance than the
Federal Rules provide, and to find it they must turn to a bewildering
array of local rules, standing orders , and standard operating procedures,
to say nothing of case law. 1 5 8 Too often they must turn to the j udge
herself. 1 59 The Federal Rules may largely eschew borrowing, 1 60 but they
are nonetheless heavily in debt. Ours is a system that would have ap
palled those who hoped for "speedier and more intelligent disposition of
the issues . . . and . . . a reduction in the expense of litigation. " 1 6 1
Attempts to discipline this chaos, such as the admirable p roj ect cur
rently studying local court rules , 1 62 may not succeed in reducing the
multiplicity of sources of rules. They may simply drive the rules further
1 5 1 See id. at 1 4 74 . There is also a trend in favor of greater allocative discretion. See, e.g. , FED. R.
Crv. P . 52.
1 52 See Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1 4 74-76; Subrin, supra note 1 37 , at 960-6 1 .
1 53 See Burbank, supra note 27, at 3 1 1 , 324 (contrasting problems of foreseeability and risks of
inappropriate procedural choices posed for trans-substantive rules with those posed for rules to
implement a single substantive scheme) .
1 54 See Subrin, supra note 1 37 ; Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1 469-70, 1 478-80; Burbank, The Chan
cellor 's Boot, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 3 1 ( 1 988).
1 55 See Clark, The Handmaid ofjustice, 2 3 WAsH. U . L.Q 297 ( 1 938); Subrin, supra note 1 37 , a t 96 1 82.
1 56 Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1 473-74.
1 57 See supra text accompanying note 1 37 .
1 58 The ninety-four federal district courts currently have an aggregate of 4,998 local rules,
not including thousands of "sub-rules," standing orders and standard operating proce
dures. These rules are extraordinarily diverse, and the numbers continue to grow rapidly.
To give one stark example, the Central District of California . . . has 3 1 local rules with 434
"sub-rules," supplemented by approximately 275 standing orders. . . .
Coquillette, I ntroduction to The Special Invitational Conference on Local Court Rules 2 (Nov. 1 2 1 3 , 1 98 7 ) .
1 59 See Burbank, The Chancellor 's Boot, supra note 1 54, at 3 3 .
1 60 See supra text accompanying note 14 7 .
1 6 1 S . REP. No. 1 1 74, supra note 1 37 . See Burbank, supra note 66, a t 425-27.
1 62 See, e.g., 1 987 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE jUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 79; supra note 1 58 .
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from official view, and hence from the view of litigants and their lawyers .
\Norse, they may drive judges further from rules . Interstate federal prac
tice cannot be any easier today than it was when proponents of the En
abling Act championed the cause of one interstate lawyer as against that
of a hundred who stayed at home, 1 63 but the costs imposed by its com
plexity are surely more widely felt. 1 64 In any event, intrastate federal
practice is itself complex and risky business , particularly in courts whos e
invocation o f sanctions 1 6 5 and other "procedural" roadblocks 1 66 signals
a reversal in the master-servant relationship . 1 6 7
I f one admits that only a lawyer can think about procedure and sub
stantive law as if they were discrete preserves , that modern federal proce
dure is complex and in large measure unpredictable, and that the Federal
Rules are in similar measure only superficially uniform and trans-sub
s tantive, alternative reform strategies appear in sharper focus . Two such
strategies have dominated recent efforts of the rulemakers and debate in
the literature. One is to enhance the p ower of trial judges to manage
litigation. 1 68 Another is to enhance incentives for people to avoid litiga
tion. 1 69 Both represent steps in the flight from law .
There is another way, one that takes seriously the interrelationship
of procedure and substantive law, that adopts a comparative view of sim
plicity and predictability, that does not equate uniformity with trans-sub
s tantivity, and that is animated by faith in a liberal view of law and hence
of rights. 1 70 If we should have s tanding orders for RICO cases, 1 7 1 why
should we not have uniform rules that govern such cases, and those l ike
them, in the respects in which they are deemed atypical, either because of their
procedural requirements or the requirements of the substantive law? 1 7 2
1 63 Senator Thomas Walsh, the bere nair of Enabling Act proponents, declared himself "for the
one hundred who stay at home as against the one who goes abroad" as early as 1 9 1 5. Simplification of

judicial Procedure: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 552 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary ,
64th Cong., 1 s t Sess. 28 ( 1 9 1 5) . See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 063-64.

1 64 "There is a growing body of specialized federa1 law and a more mobile federal bar, accompa
nied by an increased demand for specialized legal services regardless of state boundari es . " Frazier v.
Heebe, 1 07 S. Ct. 2607, 2 6 1 2 n.7 ( 1 987) .
1 65 See, e.g. , FED. R. Crv. P. 1 1 , 37; Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1478.
1 66 See, e.g. , DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 8 2 1 F.2d 1 1 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
1 08 S. Ct. 455 ( 1 987) (federal civil rights and other claims precluded by unreviewed state adminis·
trative proceedings) ; Burbank, supra note 6, at 8 1 7-22 .
1 67 See supra note 1 48 and accompanying text; infra note 1 70 and accompanying text.
1 68 See, e.g. , FED. R. Crv. P. 1 6; Resnik, Managerial judges , 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 ( 1 98 2 ) ; Burbank,
supra note 1 50, at 1 4 76-83 .
1 69 See, e.g. , Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1 483-87; Burbank, supra note 66, at 4 3 2 & n.40.
I 70 More generally, it is judges who have been closing the courthouse door, not Congress.
That they have been doing it under a system of equity rules may make the suggestion that
we consider putting more law in a merged system seem not "stingier," as Judge Weinstein
describes it, but more liberal, at least in the sense of valuing rights.
Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot , supra note 1 54 , at 34 (footnotes omitted).
1 7 1 See, e.g. , Patti v. Seider), No. 87-0223 (E.D. Pa. April 1 6, 1 987) ("RICO Case Standing
Order") .
1 72 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would continue to govern matters not deemed to re
quire special rules. Cf Rules Enabling Act of 1985: Hearing on H. R. 2633 and H. R. 3550 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on the judiciary , 99th Cong.,
1 st Sess. 9, 2 1 n. l 2 ( 1 985) (statement of Stephen B . Burbank) (noting Congress' failure to advert to
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If civil rights cases really d o require special pleading rules , 1 73 perhaps
they also require other special rules that accommodate their dis tinctive
attributes . If we should have an unofficial /Vfanual For Complex Litiga
tion , 1 74 why should we not think about a separate set of procedural rules
for complex cases, as well as a system for identifying such cases ? 1 75
Objections to such a strategy are predictable. Some will conj ure up
the writ system and the forms of action, without mentioning, let alone
comparatively evaluating, the costs of the rival system that triumphed in
1 9 38, 1 76 or crediting us with the ability to avoid the sacrifi c e of substan
tive rights at the altar of procedural purity . 1 77 We need to see
whether i t is possible t o merge l a w and equity, adversarines s and j udi
cial control, without submerging one or the other. The enterprise will
reveal substantial-perhaps unacceptable-costs , but the relevant
comparison is not just the costs of the equity-based procedure initi
ated in 1 938. . . . [F]ederal j udges are moving further beyond equity,
in some cases returning to practices previously rej ected, even at the
trial stage . 1 7 8

Others , taking a page from Thomas Walsh, the chief antagonist of
the Enabling Act, will stress the enormity of the enterprise and the inevi
table complexity of any product. 1 79 We are constantly reminded that
"judicial reform is no sport for the short-winded, " 1 80 but often the quip
more accurately describes the time it takes to sell a proposed reform than
the time invested in conceiving it. 1 8 1 In any case, simplicity is a compara
tive good, and I trust that my critics will not want to buy false
advertising . 1 82
the "possible need for specialized procedure . . . when it enacts legislation" and proposing " Proce
dural Impact Statement"); Burbank, supra note 6, at 83 1 -32 (same) .
For other suggestions that we should consider departures from the norm of trans-substantive
procedure, e.g. , Subrin, supra note 1 37, at 977, 985, 99 1 , 995-96; Rosenberg, The Federal Rules After
Half a Century , 36 ME. L. REv. 243 ( 1 984) .
1 73 See, e.g. , United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 1 8 7 (3d Cir. 1 980) . But see Marcus, The
Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 433 ( 1 986) . See also
supra note 1 72.
1 74 MANUAL FoR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) ( 1 985) .
1 75 On the dangers of using complex litigation as a norm for trans-substantive rules, see Sher
man, Restructuring the Trial Process in the Age of Complex Litigation (Book Review) , 63 TEX. L. REv. 72 1 ,
744-45 ( 1 984) ; Friedenthal, A Divirkd Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure , 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 8 1 3 ( 1 98 1 ) . See also Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1 465, 1 468.
1 76 See Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1 479.
1 77 One of the purposes of the bill that became the Enabling An was to "make it more certain
that if a plaintiff has a cause of action he would not be turned out of court upon a technicality and
without a trial upon the very merits of the case." S. REP. No. 1 1 74, supra note 1 37 .
1 78 Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1 4 79. F o r a discussion of some of the costs of this approach by
one who is equally aware of the costs of the current system, see Hazard, Forms of Action Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 628 ( 1 988) .
1 79 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 088-89, 1 1 1 1 - 1 2 .
1 80 A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS O F jUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION xix ( A . Vanderbilt ed.
1 949) .
1 8 1 What we know as the " Field Code" was prepared in an astonishingly short period of time. See
Reppy, The Field Codification Concept , in DAVID DuDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY EssAYS 33-34 ( 1 949) . The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were prepared in approximately two and one half years. See Chan
dler, Some Major Advances in the Federal judicial System, 1922- 1947, 3 1 F.R.D. 307, 49 1 -98 ( 1 963).
1 82 See supra text accompanying note 15 7.
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An obj ection to a strategy of reform of this sort not likely to be
stated , but very powerful , is the obj ection that it would require proce
dural reformers to become conversant with the subs tantive law, or at
least to work with those who are so conversant. It would thus have obvi
ous and potentially far-reaching professional and political implications,
threatening myths of expertise 1 8 3 on the one hand and of l egitimacy 1 84
on the other. Effective procedural reform will not come from a small
group of "experts , " nor will it come from the Supreme Court alone. We
need partnerships in determining how the field should be carved u p for
study, in studying it, and in implementing proposed reform s . Existing
proj ects furnish possible models for the work, 1 8 5 and we need to think
about other models. We also need to show more respect, if not for C on
gress, then for democratic ideals that we elsewhere profess. 1 8 6
West may be "such a little baby, " 1 8 7 but i t holds, at least for me,
lessons that transcend the limitations context. To some the case may
illustrate not the promise of formalism but its folly. Careful analysis
reveals, however, that the problem in West is not formalism but rather a
particular solution, itself problematic, generalized by reason of the trans
substantive scope of the Federal Rules. It is time to bring problems both
of scope and of values to the surface to see whether we are, in fact, capa
ble of generalizations, of rules, worthy of the name. 1 88
In his inaugural lecture at Oxford, Professor Atiyah concluded
with observations that well describe the dilemma of m odern federal
procedure:
I have said that perhaps one reason for the trend I have described is

that it is easier to conceal a diversity of values when principles are j et
tisoned in favor of individualized justice. But how long can this pro
cess of concealment last? At a time when the ideal of egalitarianism
rides as high as it does today, it is supremely ironical that we should at
the same time be embracing discretion and rej ecting p rinciples ; for

1 83 See, e.g. , Subrin, supra note 1 37, at 968-69.
1 84 See, e.g. , Burbank, supra note 3, at l 068, 1 1 94-97.
1 85 One existing project that could accommodate a study of the sort envisioned is the American
Law Institute's Project on Compensation and Liability for Product and Process I njuries. See AMERI
CAN LAw I NS T . 1 986 ANNUAL REPORT 1 5, 1 7.
An existing project that actually has as its goal the exploration of means to integrate substance
and process is underway at Northeastern University School of Law. The work involves collaboration
among Professors Judith Olans Brown and Phyllis Tropper Bauman, specialists in the field of em
ployment discrimination, and Professor Stephen Subrin, a specialist in procedure.
1 86 See Burbank, The Chancellor 's Boot , supra note 1 54 , at 34 . The proposal is decidedly not that
Congress assume primary responsibility for prospective procedural law. It may be useful, however,
to consider a two-track system for rules, involving "the submission to Congress of all provisions in
the area of procedure, broadly defined, that are thought to be needed, divided into two groups:
those subject to congressional review and those requiring congressional approval. " Burbank, supra
note 3 , at 1 1 95 n. 775. This is in fact the approach suggestd by Paul Carrington for the amendment
of Rule 4 . See Carrington, supra note 87, at [Ed. Tan 5 1 -55].
187 In a discussion about the original Advisory Committee's power to recommend Federal Rules
on matters of evidence, Professor Morgan observed: " I think, if you put that up to the Court, they
would say, as the servant girl said, 'It is such a little baby.' (Laughter) . " 4 Proceedings of Meeting of
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States 974
(Feb. 20-25, 1 936) (available in Harvard Law School Library) . See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 44
n.566.
1 88 See G. HAZARD, RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 9- 1 I ( 1 963).
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this process must of necessi�y enco urage and legitimize a greater ine
quality of treatment in the j udicial proce s s . The diversity of values
underlying j udicial decisions is thus conceal ed only by encouragi n g a
departure from the ideal of eq uality. 1 89

I assume that equality i s a goal o f procedural justice a s i t i s o f subs tantive
justice . I also assume that a redistribution of power may be necessary if
equality is to be achieved . Ultimately, the fate of effective procedural
reform may turn on the willingness of federal j udges to share some of
their power so that procedure may once again be the servant of justice,
procedural and substantive.

1 89 Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the judicial Process and the Law ,
IowA L. REv. 1 249, 1 2 7 1 ( 1 980).
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